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Abstract—This paper focuses on the formal veriﬁcation of
communications in Networks on Chip. We describe how an
enhanced version of the GeNoC proof methodology has been ap-
plied to the Nostrum NoC which encompasses various non-trivial
features such as a deﬂective non-minimal routing algorithm. We
demonstrate how the features of the Nostrum protocol layers
can be captured by the current version of GeNoC that enables
a step-by-step formalization of communication operations while
taking various protocol details into consideration. We prove that
packets arrive properly and that packets are never lost. Also,
we prove the soundness of the Nostrum data link, network and
transport layers.
I. INTRODUCTION
A variety of packet switched communication networks have
been proposed for providing general purpose and high per-
formance on-chip communication between multiple cores, IPs
and memories. An NoC includes many different aspects on
several levels of the protocol stack, from the physical to the
data link, to the network and the transport layer. Veriﬁcation
of each function individually and of the network as a whole is
hard. Traditional simulation has to be complemented by more
formal techniques, in particular when guaranties about loss-
less delivery, deadlock freeness and other Quality of Service
properties are concerned.
Most proposed solutions for performance, trafﬁc or behavior
analysis for NoCs are simulation or emulation-oriented [1],
[2], [3]. Few approaches address the use of formal or semi-
formal methods. A methodology to use checkers for temporal
assertions is proposed in [4]. It targets a two-level hierarchi-
cal ring structure, and PSL properties are used to express
interface-level requirements. [5] advocates communication-
centric debug instead of computation-centric debug for com-
plex SoC’s, and also uses a monitor-based solution. Both ap-
proaches rely on a formal expression of properties (assertions),
but are indeed founded on a dynamic, non formal, execu-
tion/emulation of a detailed design, where all architectural
parameters and implementation decisions have been settled.
In contrast, the work reported here is fully generic and relies
on formal veriﬁcation within a theorem prover. Our method
for verifying the correctness of the communication operations
is based on a consequential enhancement of a generic formal
model for the representation of the communications on a chip,
GeNoC [6], encoded in the ACL2 logic [7]. The new version
of GeNoC [8] makes it possible to describe the progression
of messages in the network step-by-step. Communication
operations are described faithfully, from the transport layer
to the data link layer.
Using as example the veriﬁcation of the Nostrum NoC, we
demonstrate here for the ﬁrst time the adaptability of this
model to complex infrastructures that encompass various non-
trivial features such as elaborate priority mechanisms and a
deﬂective non-minimal routing algorithm. To that goal, the
last GeNoC version has been enriched with some additional
aspects.
II. VERIFICATION PRINCIPLES
The formal meta-model represents the transmission of mes-
sages on a generic communication architecture, with an arbi-
trary network characterization (topology and node interfaces),
ﬂow control mechanism, routing algorithm and switching tech-
nique, only characterized by representative properties (proof
obligations). The main function of this model is called here
GeNoC f.
The original model [6] mainly relies on the following
functions: (1) interfaces are represented by two functions,
send to inject frames on the network, and recv to receive
frames, (2) the routing algorithm is represented by function
Routing, and the switching technique is represented by func-
tion Scheduling. The original GeNoCf function represents
atomically the transfer of messages from their source to their
destination. It expresses how a message travels in the network,
but the granularity is not the time steps of this movement.
Our current version results in new modules that contain an
explicit representation of the global state of the network, and
explicit time stamps for the emission of messages1. Function
1In addition to its data, a message contains: its source, destination, current
position, the time at which it is injected in the network, and optionally some
additional data such as its number of ﬂits or its number of hops. It is also
uniquely identiﬁed by a natural number id.R4D (“ready for departure”) determines which messages can
be in the network at the current time. Functions Routing
and Scheduling now enable a step-by-step simulation of the
evolution of the network state. At the Data Link layer, the
transmission protocol can be speciﬁed.
The main function GeNoCf takes as parameters: a list of
messages emitted at source nodes (M), the set of addresses
of the network nodes (a), a ﬁnite number of attempts (att),
an accumulator for the set of arrived messages (AM, which
is originally empty), the current state of the network (st), and
the current time (t).
Correctness theorems are associated with the GeNoC
model. Roughly speaking, property (1) states that for all topol-
ogy T , access control C, routing algorithm R, and scheduling
policy S that satisfy given constraints P1, P2, P3, and P4,
GeNoC fulﬁlls a correctness property ℘ that asserts that every
message arrived at some node n was actually issued at some
source node s and originally addressed to node n, and that it
reaches its destination without modiﬁcation of its content.
∀T ∀C ∀R ∀S,P 1(T ) ∧ P2(C) ∧ P3(R) ∧ P4(S)
⇒ ℘(GeNoC(T ,C,R,S)) (1)
Constraints (or proof obligations) P1, P2, P3, and P4,
described in [8], express essential properties of the key com-
ponents. ℘(GeNoC(T ,C,R,S)) is a logical consequence of
these constraints, and the proof of (1) is performed once
and for all, without considering the actual deﬁnitions of the
constituents.
We have recently improved the model with another property
that states that, under constraints P 
1, P 
2, P 
3, and P 
4, GeNoC
fulﬁlls a property ℘2 that asserts that no message is lost (for
instance by the transmission protocol). Constraints P 
1, P 
2, P 
3,
and P 
4 are close to P1, P2, P3, and P4, plus some additional
obligations. Some of them will be sketched in table I, section
V.
A more precise statement of properties ℘ and ℘2,u s i n g
function GeNoCf is as follows.
Theorem 1. For each arrived message (i.e., each el-
ement of the returned AM denoted GeNoC f.AM(M,
a,att,AM,st,t)), there exists a message in M with the same
id, the same destination (dest) and the same content, denoted
frm:
∀m ∈ GeNoCf(M,a,att,AM,st,t).AM,∃m  ∈ M, 
m.id = m .id ∧ m.dest = m .dest
∧ m.frm = m .frm
Theorem 2. No message is lost i.e., the union of the
identiﬁers of the arrived and en route messages is equal to
the original set of message identiﬁers:
(GeNoCf(M,a,att,AM,st,t).AMid
∪ GeNoCf(M,a,att,AM,st,t).Mid)=Mid
The global correctness of the network model is preserved
for all particular deﬁnitions satisfying the constraints. Thus,
for any new instance of network, i.e., for any T0, C0,
R0 and S0 actually deﬁned, it is sufﬁcient to discharge
proof obligations P1(T0), P2(C0), P3(R0), and P4(S0), since
℘(GeNoC(T0,C0,R0,S0)) is a logical consequence of these
properties (and similarly for ℘2). Hence, when creating a new
NoC instance, the user simply has to:
• deﬁne all the functions that model T0, C0, R0 and S0,
such as functions R4D, Routing and Scheduling,
• discharge (verify) the associated proof obligations.
III. OVERVIEW OF NOSTRUM
Nostrum [9] is a non-minimal adaptive routing network. Its
topology is a 2D-mesh. Packets are never buffered or blocked
in a switch, a packet is either ejected from the network to its
destination node or it is forwarded to a neighboring switch.
When two packets contend for the same output link, one wins
and the other is deﬂected to another output link. Thus, the
technique is called deﬂective routing or hot-potato routing,
because packets are never kept for more than one switching
cycle [10]. This leads to small switches with no buffers except
at the input and output ports.
Nostrum has a number of other features, note relevant in
this context. The routing procedure is most interesting and
explained in more detail in the following: The packets at the
ﬁve input ports are inspected. All packets include the relative
target address in their header. The target address is a tuple
(x,y), with −k<x ,y<k , where k is the number of nodes
in each dimension of the mesh. The table below shows the
possible output directions.
x y Output direction
0 0 Local port
0 < 0 South
0 > 0 North
< 0 0 West
< 0 < 0 South-West
< 0 > 0 North-West
> 0 0 East
> 0 < 0 South-East
> 0 > 0 North-East
First, the router determines the desirable directions of a
packet. Then, packets are ordered according to a priority
function. Packets pick their favored output port in the order
determined by their priority. Packets that lose the competition
for a desirable output direction, are deﬂected to an undesirable
output port. Three decisions have to be taken in this procedure:
priority of packets, selection of desirable and of undesirable
output ports.
A. Priority function
The priority function uses the hop count of a packet and
its distance to the destination. Higher hop count gives higher
priority. If the hop count is the same, packets that are closer to
their destination obtain higher priority. If two packets have the
same priority according to both criteria, it is undeﬁned which
gets preference. If older packets (i.e. higher hop count) have
priority over younger packets, livelocks can be avoided.B. Selection of a desirable output port
If a packet has the luxury that both desirable output ports
are free, then the direction is preferred in which the packet has
to travel longer. E.g. if x = −3 and y =+ 2 , the West port is
picked, because |x| > |y|. If there is the same distance in both
directions it is undeﬁned which output direction is chosen.
This technique preserves more freedom for a packet, which
may be useful later on the route. In general we observe that
the more freedom packets have in choosing their direction, the
fewer deﬂections occur. Hence, preserving freedom of choice
is an effective way to decrease the number of deﬂections.
C. Selection of an undesirable output port
If a packet loses the competition for a desirable output
direction, a non-desirable port has to be chosen. In principle,
all ports are equally bad in that the distance to the destination
is increased by two, no matter which undesirable direction
is picked. Nostrum uses two criteria to select the deﬂection
port. First, stress values of the neighbors are considered. Each
switch communicates its own load to all its neighbors through
special control wires. They indicate the level of load a switch
experiences. Undesirable ports are chosen such that packets
are deﬂected to switches which experience a lower load.
The second criterion used in Nostrum is the direction of the
network center. Under many trafﬁc patterns the center of the
network is a highly congested area, because for many packets
the way through the center is shortest. Thus, deﬂecting packets
away from the center can help to relax the load in the center.
Therefore, in Nostrum there is a preferred order of deﬂection
ports which depends on the location in the network. E.g. in
the North-Western part of the network, packets are preferably
deﬂected to the West and the North, rather then the South and
the East.
IV. GeNoC INSTANCE -T HE NOSTRUM CASE
We sketch the Nostrum instantiation, according to the
principles described in section II, with an emphasis on the
deﬁnition of the Routing function.
A. Routing function
With the deﬂective routing strategy of Nostrum, computing
all possible routes from the current position to the destination
is clearly impossible. In its initial versions [6], [11], the
GeNoC model was only able to consider atomically the
moves of messages from their sources to their destinations,
hence the concept of route was crucial and undividable. It
was impossible to deal with non-minimal adaptive routing
algorithms. The new version of GeNoC allows to reason on
the step-by-step progression of messages in the network and
offers more ﬂexibility. The notion of route is still present (and
convenient in the case of deterministic algorithms), but only
the next step node is actually signiﬁcant for non-deterministic
ones. Thus a simple solution to model the Nostrum routing is
as follows. At each step, only 4 possible routes are computed
(for messages that have not reached their destination node):
the next step node of each route corresponds to one of the
four neighbours, and the rest of the route is computed by
a function NostrumRoutingLogic that recursively calls the
following function NostrumRLogic to complete the route to
the destination. This sub-route is updated in the next recursive
call, hence preserving its accuracy. Function NostrumRLogic
implements the policy given in section III.
function NostrumRLogic(curr, dest) {
if |dest.y − curr.y| > |dest.x − curr.x| then
if dest.y < curr.y then return move-north(curr)
else return move-south(curr)
else
if curr.x < dest.x then return move-east(curr)
else return move-west(curr) }
Function NostrumRCore computes the list of all possible
routes for one message. To respect the policy of section
III-B, this list of routes is sorted according to the preference
of the routes: if possible the message should get closer to
its destination while taking the direction in which it has to
travel longer. Eight auxiliary functions are used. They play
similar roles, for instance north i hop route computes the
route such that the next step node is the north neighbour
and the rest of the route is computed according to function
NostrumRoutingLogic.
function NostrumRCore (c,d) {
if c.dir = i then // message is on an input port
{ nr=north i hop route(c,d);
sr=south i hop route(c,d);
wr=west i hop route(c,d);
er=east i hop route(c,d);
if c.x = d.x & c.y = d.y then
list(local route(c), nr, er, sr, wr);
else
if |dest.y − curr.y| > |dest.x − curr.x| then
if d.y < c.y then
if d.x < c.x then list(nr, wr, sr, er);
else list(nr, er, sr, wr);
else
if d.x < c.x then list(sr, wr, nr, er);
else list(sr, er, nr, wr);
else
if d.x < c.x then
if d.y < c.y then list(wr, nr, sr, er);
else list(wr, sr, nr, er);
else
if d.y < c.y then list(er, nr, sr, wr);
else list(er, sr, nr, wr);
}
else // message is on output port, it crosses the link
{ switch (c.port)
case N: return north o hop route(c,d);
case S: return south o hop route(c,d);
case E: return east o hop route(c,d);
case W: return west o hop route(c,d); }
}OSI layer Main proof obligations Total CPU time
Transport layer The composition of the encoding and decoding functions is the identity.
The intersection of lists TR and Delayed produced by R4D is empty.
The union of lists TR and Delayed produced by R4D equals M. 9.7 s
Network layer Routing:
Function Routing terminates (recursion is well-founded).
Each route from a current node n to a destination d actually starts in n, uses only valid
nodes, and ends in d. 524.7 s
Scheduling:
The lists of arrived and en route messages (Arr and TM) are well-formed.
The intersection of these two lists of messages Arr and TM is empty.
The union of these two lists equals list TR produced by R4D. 108.5 s
Data link layer The network state obtained after transmitting the messages (one hop) is a valid state. 4.7 s
TABLE I
MAIN CONSTRAINTS OF THE NOC CONSTITUENTS
Finally, function Routing is instantiated by function
NostrumRouting that uses NostrumRCore to compute the
routes for all the messages.
B. Scheduling function
Nostrum uses a packet switching technique. One of the
advantages of GeNoC is that, once the core packet switching
technique (or any other constituent) has been formalized and
veriﬁed for a given NoC, it can straightforwardly be adapted to
any other network. This is the case here, we reuse the packet
scheduling core function deﬁned for the Spidergon NoC in
[12]. This function, called NostrumPS here, mainly returns
the list of messages that are still en route, and those that have
reached their destination.
Function NostrumPScheduling is the instance of function
Scheduling. It calls function NostrumPS to process the mes-
sages, previously sorted according to their age (hop count), in
decreasing order. If two messages have the same hop count, the
priority is given to the message that is closer to its destination
(section III-A).
Finally, we recall that each node keeps track of a history of
its load during the previous cycles, to be able to optimize the
choice between possible routes in case one of the desirable
routes cannot be taken (section III-C): the actual route can be
chosen in the direction of the less loaded neighbours. Function
NostrumTestRoutes,u s e db yNostrumPS, returns the route
that will likely be taken according to this policy (considering
the average loads of the neighbouring nodes), or no route if
no move is feasible (which is possible if the message is trying
to leave a local port towards the network).
V. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Table I outlines the main proof obligations for all the key
constituents. A total number of 68 functions were deﬁned in
ACL2 to instantiate all the constituents of the model, and 272
theorems (proof obligations + some auxiliary theorems) have
been proven, for a total CPU time of about 12 minutes on an
Intel Core Duo, 1.6 GHz.
NoCs are complex commmunication systems realizing a
sophisticated protocol stack in a distributed and concurrent
implementation. It is non-trivial to ensure their correctness.
With the extended GeNoC model, we have analyzed some
essential properties of Nostrum, a state of the art NoC. We
have shown that packets arrive properly and that packets are
never lost. Since the method in [13] allows for calculating the
maximum delay, we could prove the soundness of the Nostrum
data link, network and transport layers.
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